
«-v^ ' 



COMMODORE CONNER 



[Note on " Maclay's Histor\ 

^ Mexican \V:u 



'ites Navy 



") 






^10 

.Oh i 



i LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 






^z^/i.^ 




COMMODORE CONNER 



/Note on " Maclay's Histor}' of the United States Navy"\ 
^ Mexican War ^ 



By R S. p. Conner 



From the "United vService Review," Jui.y, 1S95 



Cn- 



32 THE UNITED SERVICE. July 



COMMODORE CONNER} 

In the sliort notice of the operations of the United States Sq\iadron in 
the Gulf during our war with Mexico, in 1846 and 1847 (Chap, vi., 
vol. ii.), Mr. Maclay, in common with the most of our naval writers, 
neglects the unity of his theme. For instance, the transactions in the 
Gulf were all carried out by one fleet, officially styled " The Home 
Squadron," and that force, during the period of more than three years, 
— that is, from the last of 1843 down to March 21, 1847, — was under 
the sole, undivided command of one officer, namely. Commodore 
David Conner, who, as commander-in-chief of the Home Squadron 
and Station, ordered and executed by himself or through his lieutenants 
all of the operations within the times mentioned, not only in the Gulf 
of Mexico, but also in the North Atlantic and Caribbean seas. 

The duties intrusted to Commodore Conner by the Secretary of the 
Navy were multifarious : first, he was to keep the vessels of the squad- 
ron well equipped, disciplined, and actively employed ; then our coast 
was to be guarded, the cold northern seas to be searched for ships in 
distress, the tropics frequented for the same purpose with that of sup- 
pressing piracy and the slave trade, and also to the end that commerce 
might thrive and friendship remain between us and the outer world. 
Nor was this all ; the " Oregon Question" had ruffled the quiet of our 
relations with England, and so her fleet ofi" our coast had to be care- 
fully watched. In the midst of all this came the Mexican imbroglio, 
and it demanded the attention of the commander of the Home Squad- 
ron in addition to the other weighty matters before mentioned. And 
all of the varied yet constant attention required came from one man 
and one squadron ; not from two or more, as some might suppose from 
Mr. Maclay's " History ;" for, in addition to his original force, even 
those officers who sailed under special instructions from the Secretary 
of the Navy, if not ordered out of Commodore Conner's station, were 
directed ultimately to place themselves under his command. 

Possessing, as I do, my father's official and private correspondence 
relative to the time covered by the sixth chapter of the second volume, 
I am forced to say that in Mr. Maclay's narration of events, chronology, 
inferences, and impressions conveyed, there are many errors. For in- 

' Note on Maclay's " History of the United States Navy," Mexican War. 



1895. C0M3I0D0RE CONNER, 33 

stance, Commodore Conner did not wait for particular instructions to 
blockade (pp. 171, 172), but did so at the breaking out of actual hos- 
tilities, a prompt fulfillment of the Secretary's known wishes most 
gratifying, and for which the commodore received renewed expression 
of approval and congratulation from the Department. Moreover, 
several of the vessels, seemingly stated to have then joined him, had 
long been of his force. In regard to Tuspan (p. 72), Commodore 
Conner never " collected a naval force" before that town. What he 
did was simply to dispatch the " Truxtun" to blockade it. After that 
vessel was wrecked by striking a reef, he sent down the " Princeton" 
with orders to either tow the brig off or destroy her. Being immova- 
bly fixed, she was burnt in the enemy's sight. 

In regard to Alvarado (pp. 172, 173), it is correctly stated that all 
of the flotilla could not cross the bar, and so the attack (which was in- 
tended not to capture the town, as popularly supposed, but merely to 
cut out the enemy's vessels there sheltered) could not be delivered. 
The main attack, however, was not from the " Mississippi," but from 
the flotilla led by Commodore Conner in the " Vixen." This little 
steamboat, though striking, was carried across the bar, but could not, 
with her " tow" of armed boats, stem the current of the river so as to 
pass quickly beyond the concentrated fire of the enemy's batteries. 
Under these circumstances, together with the grounding of the second 
division in tow of the " McLane," progress could not be made, the whole 
expedition having to retire, there being no safe anchorage near. " This 
inauspicious opening," says our author, " threw a shadow of distrust 
over the American squadron ;" but he omits to add that this distrust 
was caused by want of knowledge, — ignorance of the fact that, with 
the single exception of the " Vixen," the Gulf Squadron at that time 
did not possess one vessel adapted to the peculiar service required. 
Even the " Vixen," as shown, could not master the strong current of 
the river under all circumstances. For this reason Commodore Con- 
ner could nof sfem the current of the Alvarado River, the power of the 
steamboats of his flotilla being too weak; his second in command, 
Commodore Perry, could not accomplish the part assigned to him, 
— namely, the shelling out of the land batteries, — because the " Missis- 
sippi" and the other large heavily-armed ships drew far too much 
water to come within proper range of the forts. Thus the attempt 
failed because the means then afforded by our goverment were unfit 
for the purpose. This fact was not generally known at that time, 
hence the adverse criticism which appeared in the press of the day, and 
which the most writers of the present have copied and thus continued, 
instead of going to the source of correct information, — viz., the Na:vy 
Department, — where rest the official correspondence and other arcliives 
which (notably in the instance of the Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy for the year 1846, Senate Documents, 2d Sess., 29th Congress, 
Vol. XIV. N. S.— No. 1. 3 



34 THE UNITED SERVICE. July 

vol. i. pp. 282, 283, and also in that of Commodore Perry's letter to 
that officer) distinctly point out and acknowledge Commodore Conner's 
inadequate means. Although adequate means were early and repeatedly 
requested by Commodore Conner, the Navy Department was unable to 
supply them during Conner's term of service. Such means, however, 
at length reached his successor, Commodore Perry, who, using them 
well, was by them enabled to reap complete success. Commodore Con- 
ner used to the best advantage the means put by the government in 
his hands. If there was failure, it arose from the inadequacy of those 
means, a fact which true historians will be most careful to point out, 
for otherwise the inference does a great wrong to an officer who served 
his country not only with high commendation from his government, but, 
in truth, faithfully and well, as can be seen by all who choose to look 
at the authentic official correspondence at Washington, and not merely 
at the shallow publications of that day, — publications false and mis- 
leading because their authors, even when spectators, could not fully 
understand what they saw, being to a great degree ignorant of its causes, 
and therefore incapable of properly appreciating the circumstances or 
of forming a just opinion as to correct action under them. A good 
instance of this is aiforded by the assertion, made by some of these 
lookers-on, that Commodore Conner showed hesitation and indecision 
at the entering of the Alvarado River. The true cause of delay was 
the late setting in of the sea breeze, an impelling force required and 
waited for to assist the steamers with their heavy tow of boats filled 
with armed men on the way up the stream, and against its strong out- 
flowing current. 

I have mentioned Commodore Perry as second in command of the 
Home Squadron, and so he was at that time, as Captain Gregory had 
been before the former came, — that is, because he outranked all of the 
officers in the squadi'ou, excepting Commodore Conner, but not from 
possessing any right or authority to share with the last-named officer 
the command of the said squadron ; that command being wholly undi- 
vided and solely in the hands of Commodore Conner as commander- 
in-chief. Hence, as I have above shown, it is an error to suppose, as 
;Some have, that Conner's command of the fleet was either divided or 
Jield in common with Perry or any one else. For more than three 
years, down to March 21, 1847, the Home Squadron was under the 
sole command of Commodore Conner. Although Perry had already 
commanded a squadron, and was officially styled " Commodore" by the 
Secretary of the Navy, such was his eagerness to serve, when the war 
broke out with Mexico, that he accepted the only command then open, 
— namely, the inferior one of a single ship, the " Mississippi," in 
Conner's fleet. The Secretary of the Navy, however, authorized Perry 
to carry the red pennant of a vice-commodore, but told him at the 
same time (order of August 20, 1846) that this flag would not increase 



1895. COMMODORE CONNER. 35 

his authority during the presence of Commodore Conner, whose com- 
mand of both fleet and station was supreme. Such being , Perry's 
status at that time, it was not permissible for him to execute any direct 
authority over the fleet, or even a part of it, after he had joined his 
superior officer Conner ; hence, unless the latter of his own accord 
placed the steamers of his force in Perry's special charge as a separate 
and permanent squadron of the fleet, of which there is no proof, the 
assertion of the Rev. Dr. Griffis (Life of Perry, pp. 198, 199; Mag. 
of Am. Hist.,, vol. xiii. p. 429) that the " Home Squadron was di- 
vided," Conner commanding the sailing vessels and Perry the steamers, 
is totally wrong, practically as well as officially, as shown by the 
orders cited above. 

Since writing the preceding I have discovered the apparent root from 
which springs Dr. Griffis's erroneous idea of a divided command, — viz., 
to Perry was given the charge of conveying to Conner's fleet the 
re-enforcement of two streamers, a temporary command, misconstrued 
by Dr. Griffis into a permanent one, embracing the entire steam force 
of the fleet. {Vide order of Secretary of Navy to Commodore Perry 
of August 20, 1846, given on p. 97, vol. xiv., Mag. of Am. Hist.) 

And here, being concerned with the Eev. Dr. Griffis, I will mention 
that that gentleman takes occasion, on the authority of a newspaper 
correspondent, to charge Commodore Conner with both negligence and 
cruelty in refusing to receive some fugitives from Vera Cruz (Life of 
Perry, p. 224). In the first place, supposing the story to be true, it 
must be borne in mind that these people had been warned in advance 
of the bombardment, sufficient time having been granted them to re- 
move to shelter beyond the city walls ; hence the charge of " negli- 
gence" falls. This chance they had neglected, but, nevertheless, they 
had escaped from Vera Cruz and were, at this very time, in a place of 
safety. If my father refused to take them from that place of shelter, 
the refusal cannot be called cruel. No, it was neither from negligence 
nor cruelty that my father acted, but from some good reason, and in 
accordance with what he believed to be his duty, a line of conduct 
from which nothing would ever turn him, even though to maintain it 
caused him the deepest pain. 

What those officers thought of him — those that knew him lone^est 
and best — is well expressed in this echo of their words to me, — namely, 
that he was not only a brave man, but also a man wise and good : an 
opinion which the following letter to him^ from the commanding 
British naval officer in the Gulf, at this very time, confirms : " Permit 
me to express my sense of your kind and considerate courtesy. Al- 
though ever strict in maintaining your just, belligerent rights, you 
have, sir, caused the evils necessarily attendant on warfare to fall 
as lightly as possible on neutrals, and in the war against your enemy 
you have contrived to win even his gratitude by having on every 



36 THE UNITED SERVICE. July 

possible occasion mercifully spared the poor and helpless. You have 
zealously performed your duty, while at the same time your modera- 
tion and magnanimity have gained ^r you the esteem of friend and 
foe." (Abstract.) 

But although Commodore Conner did not organize any part of his 
fleet into a permanent squadron for Commodore Perry, he did, more 
than once, form a squadron for special service, and place it temporarily 
in that officer's charge. Such were the expeditions to Tabasco and 
Laguna, actions ordered by Commodore Conner as commander-in- 
chief and executed by Commodore Perry as his lieutenant or vice- 
commodore j but this the ordinary historian neglects to say, and hence 
the uninformed reader naturally infers that Perry was acting by right 
of independent command. In truth, the occupation and subjugation 
of Yucatan were effected, originally, by Commodore Conner acting 
through his lieuteuant Commodore Perry. Conner, with great gen- 
erosity, placed the Yucatan, and also the* Tabasco, expedition in 
charge of Perry, refraining to lead them himself so that Perry might 
have alone all of the credit arising from them. Conduct so magnan- 
imous should not be passed by in silence, nor should historians so 
write that the reader is left in utter ignorance of the fact that our first 
subjugation of Yucatan was the effect of Commodore Conner's ad- 
ministration as commander-in-chief in the Gulf. It was in October 
(1846) that Conner dispatched Perry to Tabasco, from which he re- 
turned in November, and it was in December (not " September," as 
stated by Mr. Maclay and other writers) that he was likewise sent to 
Laguna. The true chronology of the events occurring in the Gulf 
during the year 1846, and part of 1847, can be found in my letter to 
the Army and Navy Journal of April 19, 1884, entitled " Commodore 
Conner in the Gulf of Mexico." To this account of the operations 
of the Home Squadron I beg to call the attention of naval writers, 
because it is based not on hearsay, but on the authentic records coeval 
with the time. The same failure to properly connect the Panuuco 
River expedition, under Commander Tattnall (p. 176), with the general 
plan of the operations then being executed by the orders of Commo- 
dore Conner and, in this instance, directly under his eye, gives the 
impression that it was an independent one, thereby detracting just so 
much from the merit and services of Conner as commander-in-chief, 
and so it is a manner of narration not only erroneous, but also 
unfair. 

We now come to the descent on Vera Cruz, which is but sketched 
by Mr. Maclay. In regard to this operation, I will here mention 
that, from a comparison of the original orders of General Scott with 
those issued by Commodore Conner and carried out (both of which I 
have), it is evident that the general at first intended it to be a purely 
military transaction executed solely by himself, and to this end he had 



1895. COMMODORE CONNER. 37 

ordered over a hundred surf-boats, and gathered a miscellaneous collec- 
tion of vessels in which he embarked his army, and from which he 
would have attempted to land it near Vera Cruz. But when he ar- 
rived at that station and was brought face to face with the great diffi- 
culties and risk of such a course, and, moreover, found that Commo- 
dore Conner had anticipated and could avoid them all by a plan of his 
own, whereby an organized squadron of the navy was to be substituted 
for a mere collection of trading vessels, and, moreover, that the whole 
coast had been searched by the commodore's orders and the best place 
for a landing discovered, Scott changed his intention, and accepting 
Conner's invitation (for the army can command nothing of the navy) to 
receive the troops into the frigates of the squadron, placed the army 
for that occasion in the hands of the navy, by which it was duly trans- 
ported and landed to the siege of Vera Cruz. By far the greater part 
of this army, of twelve thousand men, was carried from Anton Lizardo, 
the naval head-quarters and rendezvous, to the place of debarkation, 
the beach of Collado, opposite Sacrificios Island, in the various ships 
of Commodore Conner's squadron ; the " Raritan" and the " Potomac" 
alone having on board over five thousand men, while three thousand 
more or over came in the sloops-of-war. Some of General Scott's 
transports brought the rest, sailing in convoy of the squadron by per- 
mission, for Commodore Conner, in consequence of the confined an- 
chorage at Sacrificios, had warned from it all sail exclusive of the 
actual expedition. French Forrest, captain of the " Raritan," was 
appointed by Commodore Conner, with a staff of naval officers and a 
body of seamen, to superintend and execute the order of debarkation, 
a duty performed with the greatest ability and dispatch. (SeeCommo. 
Conner's orders and dispatches ; Temple's " Memoir," given in part by 
Cooper's "Naval History," ed, of 1854; Semmes's "Service Afloat 
and Ashore during the Mexican War," ed. of 1851.) 

This descent, a purely naval operation. Commodore Conner led in 
his flag-ship, the " Raritan," General Scott accompanying in the " Mas- 
sachusetts." In the descent there was no combined effort ; the army 
was passive, the navy active. But when that army was thrown ashore 
by the navy, the former's action commenced; but not even then its in- 
dependent action, for its dependence on the naval fleet was such that 
through the latter was received not only the army's subsistence, but 
even the actual means by which Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa 
quickly fell, — to wit, the naval battery, the heavy guns, taken from 
the squadron's ships and manned by their officers and seamen, that, 
breaching the walls, forced a surrender of both city and castle. These 
guns were landed by Perry, but Conner had planned for that landing 
before Perry's arrival. Thus, while the descent on Vera Cruz was a 
purely naval operation, the siege was a combined one of navy and army. 
Kor did this participation of the navy in the action of the army cease 



38 THE UNITED SERVICE. July 

with the fall of Vera Cruz, for Commodore Conner having, in com- 
pliance to General Scott's graceful request, permitted the marines of 
the fleet to land with the army, that force marched with the latter even 
to the City of Mexico, and so participated in the crowning triumph of 
the war. 

I have been thus particular and explicit, because nearly every 
writer on this subject states, either directly or suggestively, that Scott 
landed his army and took Vera Cruz. General Scott did not land 
his army, nor did he alone take Vera Cruz. His army was landed by 
the navy, and Vera Cruz was taken by the army and the navy. To 
state otherwise, and thus ignore the navy, is to falsify fact and to do in- 
justice to the marine arm of our service. 

Proceeding, our author writes : 

"On the 20th of March [1847] Captain Perry arrived [returned], 
and on the 21st he superseded Captain Conner in command of the 
Gulf fleet" (p. 179). Mr. Maclay, being a civilian, may not be aware 
that the term " supersede" is never properly applied to a change of 
commanders unless the one surrendering command is deprived of it in 
consequence of some fault committed by him. Since Commodore 
Conner was charged with no fault by the Navy Department, but, on 
the contrary, had received from it and also from the President 
approval and uninterrupted praise, its use here is unjust as well as 
improper. 

In the navy, at that time, the term of service for a flag-officer 
continued three years, provided illness or misbehavior did not cut it 
short ; if the former, he was " relieved" of the command ; if the latter, 
he was "superseded." In the instance of the whole term being served 
out satisfactorily, then, at its end, the officer was " relieved" of the 
command, which he turned over to his successor or " relief," as that 
officer is called. Now, in the instance of Commodore Conner, he, in 
March, 1847, had more than served out the regular term of three years, 
being well into the fourth. His relief. Commodore Perry, had been 
long fixed upon ; but the Navy Department, knowing how much was 
due to Commodore Conner for his long season of arduous and unflag- 
ging service, hesitated to relieve him, because it thought that hg should 
reap the reward of his long and faithful effbrts, particularly in re- 
ceiving, on the part of the navy, the surrender of Vera Cruz and 
San Juan de UHoa. At the same time, however, the Department was 
embarrassed by what might be due to Commodore Perry, for this 
officer had been promised the command upon the retirement of Com- 
modore Conner ; but the latter officer could not, voluntarily, leave his 
post during a time of war, and in the very face of the enemy ; he 
could leave only when expressly ordered so to do by his government. 
This Conner told Perry, who naturally was aware thereof, adding, 
however, that he would, of course, at once resign to him the command 



1895. COMMODORE CONNER. 39 

when so ordered, which he did. But the Department, as stated, hesi- 
tated to issue such an order, for the reasons already given, and because 
it anticipated that the fall of Vera Cruz into Scott and Conner's hands 
would take place by the last of February, thereby giving Conner his 
due, and affording a fitting opportunity for releasing him from his 
protracted labors and of placing Perry in the promised position. Had 
this occurred the difficulty would have been well solved, Conner receiving 
his due, and Perry the chance for action he desired. But fate deciding 
otherwise, there befell a great misfortune to Commodore Conner. 
Although he was ready and waiting for General Scott at the time 
above mentioned, that commander did not join the commodore in the 
Gulf until March. The delay proved fatal to the intentions of the 
Navy Department and to Commodore Conner's just dues. 

So much had Scott's delay protracted Conner's term of service, and 
thereby encroached upon Perry's promised one, that the President 
decided, much as he esteemed Conner, that the latter's term could not 
be further extended, and that the promise to Perry should be fulfilled 
at once, because his excellency was also alarmed by the reports of 
Conner's broken health and alleged consequent physical inability to 
carry on the active operations under way. That my father was greatly 
wasted in body by his long and arduous services is true; but that he 
could not have concluded those labors, by doing all that was required 
by the naval commander-in-chief at the siege of Vera Cruz, is a mis- 
take ; because the most arduous part of that operation, for the com- 
mander of the squadron, was already done by him, while that which 
followed was by him provided for; no action occurred which he 
could not have performed. The consequence of all the work and 
preparation carried out by liim — viz., the surrender of the place — was 
inevitable, but the matter of a few days ; hence the loss to him of this 
result amounted not only to a great loss, but was the infliction upon 
him of a great wrong, a wrong which has grown with time, because 
the later historians have followed the unavoidably imperfect printed 
accounts of that day, written by persons who saw but the surface aud 
know not the " why and w^herefore," instead of going to the official 
correspondence, at Washington, containing reasons as well as bare 
appearances. The adage that "correct judgment cannot be founded 
on outward appearances" is well illustrated in this instance, and the 
fact that if truth remains error grows is proved by the increasing 
bulk of the error issued by the press whenever the services of the 
Home Squadron in the war with Mexico are mentioned, and also in 
the omission of Commodore Conner's name in connection with those 
operations in which he was the chief mover ; omissions and neglect 
which, although due in a degree to the ignorance and want of historic 
comprehensiveness in the writers, have their root in the great wrong 
done to him by depriving him of his just due, — the receiving of the 



40 THE UNITED SERVICE. July 

surrender of Vera Cruz, — a wrong which caused him and his actions to 
be misunderstood by those who merely saw and knew not the real 
cause for the act, and therefore attributed it to displeasure, on the part 
of the government, in consequence of misconduct on the part of Com- 
modore Conner, both of which inferences are entirely false, but, never- 
theless, quite natural under the circumstances in which were placed the 
spectators. It is this error and its consequent injury to Commodore 
Conner that historians should expose and correct, instead of add to. 
But this act of simple justice will not be done, so long as they but 
follow the shallow writers, the mere spectators, of that day, instead of 
referring, as I have already said, to the official records at Washington. 

The sudden surrender of the command of the Home Squadron by 
Commodore Conner to Commodore Perry, so surprising to all present, 
arose neither from the distrust of the Navy Department nor from its 
dissatisfaction with Commodore Conner, but simply because Conner 
obeyed his government promptly, and kept his word to Perry. These 
are but simple acts of duty; but, in this instance, owing to its peculiar 
circumstances, their carrying out by Commodore Conner, placed him in 
false position ; the transfer of command being made in the middle of a 
siege, the mere spectators naturally inferred that the retiring officer was 
superseded for cause; but the true reason for the time of the relief was 
merely the accidental one of Perry's return, with the order of relief, at 
that particular time. 

This act, the surrender of supreme command at the moment of 
assured victory, made without a murmur, although with it went all the 
laurels of the triumph, has, I believe, no parallel in our history. As 
an example of strict and immediate obedience to orders, it stands forth 
a shining model for future time. With such unquestioning submission 
to higher authority in the army and navy, we may have no fear that 
either will give the republic mutineers, instead of faithful and obedient 
servants. 

A noticeable feature of Mr. Maclay's account of the old navy is 
the omission of the term "commander-in-chief," and the title "com- 
modore," both of which were ojicially applied to its officers. By never 
using the first he has helped to confuse his narrative and to destroy its 
historic unity ; by ignoring the latter, through overstraining after cor- 
rectness, he has toppled over into utter incorrectness; for, by invariably 
calling every one of the old commodores "captains," he imparts 
the false impression that such was each one's title. In the old navy, 
the highest lineal rank was that of captain ; but when a captain was 
given command of a squadron, or fleet of ships, he was officially styled, 
by the Navy Department, "commodore," never simply "captain." 
When one of these commodores was the commander-in-chief of a fleet 
and station he held supreme command therein, with power unlimited 



1895. C0M3WD0RE CONNER. 41 

save by the laws of the United States. His " broad pennant" was 
worn not at the fore nor at the mizzen, but as the flag of a full admiral 
at the main, and, as stated, it carried with it all of an admiral's 
authority. 

The greater part of Mr. Maclay's book has received much commen- 
dation, and justly. It even charmed the Saturday Review into for- 
getting to act the '"' porcupine;" and now let me close this " note" with 
the hope that the " History's" future edition will extend its merits and 
excellences into the chapter dealing with the Home Squadron in the 
Mexican War. 

P. S. P. Conner. 

313 South Twenty-second Street, Philadelphia. 



